Misconceptions, Miscalculations, and Mistakes: P2P, China, and Copyright by Leung, Tao
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 30
Number 1 Fall 2006 Article 6
1-1-2006
Misconceptions, Miscalculations, and Mistakes:
P2P, China, and Copyright
Tao Leung
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tao Leung, Misconceptions, Miscalculations, and Mistakes: P2P, China, and Copyright, 30 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 151 (2006).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol30/iss1/6
Misconceptions, Miscalculations, and
Mistakes: P2P, China, and Copyright
By TAO LEUNG*
Introduction
Imagine John C. Holder, a fruitstand owner, catches a young boy
stealing an apple from his stand. Because John does not wish to be
deprived of an asset that rightfully belongs to him, he immediately
calls the authorities to throw the boy in prison (without realizing that
the boy did not know he was stealing and was bringing the apple back
to his sickly sister). Upon realizing that there are apple trees available
for free public consumption adjacent to his stand, he spends
thousands of dollars hiring bulldozers to plow down the trees. John
then institutes strict security measures that subject customers and
potential thieves alike to invasive searches. Although these measures
thwart some thieves, they do not completely eradicate the problem
and winds up turning away some of his most faithful customers. He
then creates signs that state: "Stealing apples is a crime and those
caught will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law."
Unbeknownst to John, the signs are in a different language than the
one commonly used in the area and even those who can understand
the language find the rule contrary to that area's social and cultural
norms. Despite these measures, the stealing continues until John C.
Holder is bankrupt.
This scenario mirrors both what the entertainment industry has
done in its attempt to solve the online illegal file sharing problem as
well as what the United States has attempted in its quest to institute
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better intellectual property protections in China. The purpose of this
note is to illustrate how both the United States and the RIAA
adopted narrow-minded approaches in a desperate attempt to curtail
burgeoning intellectual property infringement, and how these
approaches not only proved ineffective, but possibly exacerbated the
problem.
Part one will focus on how, for entirely selfish reasons, the music
industry in particular has treated the advent of peer-to-peer ("P2P")
technologies such as Kazaa, BitTorrent, and FreeNet as a death knell
for copyright protections. It will then discuss how this parochial
vision has prevented the recording industry from providing limitless
opportunity, instead of causing massive and misguided bad publicity
and reduced sales. The industry has also ignored economic, social,
and cultural realities, and naively believes its misguided rules will
deter further illegal file sharing.
Part two will discuss how the United States has approached
intellectual property protection in China just as narrow-mindedly as it
handles the music industry. The United States' approach illustrates
its obsession with fiscally driven motives, belief that its system is
superior, and apathy for sustained development or collateral costs.
The United States has responded to the continued piracy in China by
blaming various scapegoats and adopting measures that are coercive,
grossly inefficient, and unproductive. The United States' strict
standards also disregard cultural, social, political, and economic
realities, making these laws virtually ineffective.
Part three will propose possible solutions to both situations,
providing alternatives to the current disastrous outcomes.
I. The Record Industry's Battle Against P2P Infringers
A. Misguided Approach
The emergence of P2P technologies such as Kazaa, Napster, and
BitTorrent has made it possible for users to easily share electronic
files on peer-to-peer networks.' This technology enables users to
download music and other works free of charge, depriving copyright
holders of revenue they potentially could have received through
1. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770
(2005).
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tangible purchases.2 Large-scale copyright holders such as the
Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") argue that
P2P networks facilitate "internet piracy" and must immediately be
stopped.3 Essentially, the entertainment industry equates online
downloading of copyrighted content with theft.'
However, this analogy provides an oversimplified view of the
complex nature of copyright law.' The RIAA's simple theft analogy
ignores several issues that bear on the legal ramifications of P2P
technology.
Foremost among those issues is the purpose of the Copyright
Act.6 The Copyright Act grants a copyright holder "exclusive rights
to use and authorize the use of his work in five qualified ways."7
However, the purpose of the Act is not to confer unlimited rights and
a monopoly over the work to its creator. Rather, the Act is meant to
provide a reward for creative works in order to "stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good" and thus "promot[e] broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts." 8
Many advocates of P2P file sharing contend that P2P technology
satisfies both these purposes.9 P2P provides an easy method to
promote the "broad availability" of works because files can be
instantaneously shared throughout the globe."°
P2P also helps stimulate artistic creativity by providing incentives
to create. The RIAA has chosen to focus solely on the piracy of
copyrighted works, which protects the rights of its own artists."
While the RIAA's concern for its own artists is understandable, it is
far too shortsighted. P2P file sharing allows emerging artists - many
2. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and
the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263,264.
3. Michael Suppappola, The End of the World as We Know It? The State of
Decentralized Peer-to-Peer Technologies in the Wake of Metro-Goldwin-Mayer
Studios v. Grokster, CONN. PUB. INT. L. J., 2004, at 122, 123.
4. Respect Copyrights.Org, at <www.respectcopyrights.org/content.html>
(follow "What is Piracy" hyperlink) (visited February 18, 2006).
5. Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
653, 668 (2005).
6. Suppappola, supra note 3, at 128.
7. Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
433 (1984).
8. Id. at 431-32.
9. Suppappola, supra note 3, at 123.
10. Id
11. Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 384 (2003).
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of whom the established music industry tends to ignore due to
production limitations - to promote their work to a broad audience. 2
Most artists do not have the resources to promote themselves through
radio, television, or touring because only a tiny fraction of artists
(approximately 2 percent) sign recording contracts with big labels.13
In this way, P2P encourages creative works that might otherwise not
have an opportunity to thrive.
14
By adopting a narrow perspective that file sharing is merely a
conduit for copyright infringement and the cause of sagging CD sales,
the RIAA missed an opportunity to capitalize on a new distribution
model with unlimited potential for profit. 5 The RIAA could have
received profits for the same copyrighted material at a fraction of the
cost of distribution by eliminating the need for warehouses and
reducing, manufacturing costs. 6 Instead, it obstinately clung to
outdated profit levels, distribution models, and attitudes toward
consumers. One approach the record industry might have adopted
was to treat MP3s - the popular format in which music files are traded
- as the new CDs. For example, when CDs were first introduced and
began to gain popularity, cassettes sales simultaneously dropped. 7
Borrowing from past experience, the RIAA should have developed
strategies to market the new technological innovation rather than
hoping it would just disappear." As Peter Yu insightfully observes
about this situation, "the key to success is not how a firm or in this
case an industry, protects its existing business model, but how it
adapts that model to new conditions and technological
environments."19
12. ]d
13. Laurence Pulgram, Napster's Side of the Story, at
<writ.corporate.findlaw.com/commentary/20000501_napster.html> (visited March 2,
2006).
14. Id.
15. Yu, supra note 5, at 749.
16. Stuart Biggs, Public Tires of Same Old Song from an Industry Slow to
Change, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 13, 2005, at 2.
17. Ger Tillekens, Trends and Shifts in U.S. Music Sales, JOURNAL ON MEDIA
CULTURE, (April 1999), available at <www.icce.rug.nl/-soundscapes/VOLUME02/
Trendsand-shifts in-musicsales.html> (visited February 17, 2006).
18. Ian Condry, Cultures of Music Piracy: An Ethnographic Comparison of the
US and Japan, 7 INT'L J. CULTURAL STUD. (Sept. 2004), available at
<ics.sagepub.com/content/vol7/issue3> (visited October 12, 2006).
19. Yu, supra note 5, at 749.
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B. Misguided Solutions
Because the RIAA viewed P2P technology as a threat instead of
an opportunity, it decided to eliminate that threat. Fortunately, the
RIAA did not adopt the most extreme solutions, such as Senator
Orrin Hatch's (R-Utah) suggestion that he "favor[ed] developing new
technology to remotely destroy the computers of people who illegally
download music from the Internet" because that "may be the only
way you can teach somebody about copyrights."2 Nevertheless, the
RIAA engaged in other coercive means to curtail P2P file sharing,
most notably suing individual file-sharers."
Although the RIAA settled with most of the defendants for
amounts that ranged from $12,000 to $17,500, it reasoned that the
damage amounts were high enough to catch the attention of file
swappers and intimidate them into continuing their illegal practices.22
However, the proposed "solution" of suing individual file-sharers was
fraught with difficulties that rendered it impractical, grossly
inefficient, and ineffective.23 Successful enforcement is infeasible
because the Internet is transnational and decentralized and file-
sharers have access to military grade cryptography."
To further complicate matters, the only way the RIAA has been
able to find individual infringers is if the Internet service provider
("ISP") turns over the infringer's IP address.2" Initially, a district
court in In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc., ("Verizon I") enforced
the RIAA's subpoena against an ISP without a pending lawsuit.26
However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
overturned the district court's decision and forced the copyright
holders to first file a lawsuit.27  As a result, filing lawsuits against
individual file-sharers became incredibly expensive, labor-intensive,
20. Dwight Silverman, Senator's 'Extreme' Cure for Piracy is Unconstitutional,
Hous. CHRON., June 21, 2003, at 1C.
21. Jeordan Legon, 261 Music File Swappers Sued: Amnesty Program Unveiled,
at <www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/09/08/music.downoading> (visited March 1,
2006).
22. Yu, supra note 5, at 660.
23. Yu, supra note 11, at 379.
24. Id.
25. Yu, supra note 5, at 659.
26. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 240 F.
Supp. 2d 24 (D.C. Cir 2003)
27. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 351 F.3d
1229, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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and time-consuming.28
Further, innovative technology is constantly making the
detection of file-sharers even more difficult." FreeNet, for example,
is a program intended to prevent governments and corporations from
restricting the flow of any kind of digital information. FreeNet uses a
secure approach of routing between users by employing encryption to
protect the information from eavesdroppers who were not directly
invited to be part of the network.'
The practical difficulties of suing every file-sharer have made
most of the 150 million P2P users rightfully believe they will never be
hauled into court, meaning the RIAA's threat of litigation is not a
deterrent.3
Even if the RIAA could somehow sue each infringer, doing so
would be imprudent. 2  Since many users of P2P networks also
purchase the tangible forms of the music they download, the RIAA
would be suing its own consumers - a terrible business decision.33
Copyright owners would be suing the very consumers who provide a
very large share of their profits. The RIAA's decision to sue its own
customers is already being considered one of the largest public
relations disasters of recent history. Jesse Jordan, the father of a file
sharing defendant and owner of thousands of records and CDs,
declared:
[The RIAA] has sued one of their most avid customers. The RIAA
says that they wanted to teach these kids and their families a lesson.
The lesson we learned is that we will never ever buy another
product from any of those companies again. That's the lesson we're
going to tell everyone.34
The RIAA has also instituted coercive measures that target
suppliers, such as the software developers who provide platforms for
28. Yu, supra note 5, at 675.
29. John Markoff, New File sharing Techniques Are Likely to Test Court
Decision, THE NEW YORK TIMES, August 1, 2005, at Cl.
30. Id.
31. U.S. Representative Howard L. Berman, The Truth About the Peer to Peer
Privacy Prevention Act: Why Copyright Owner Self-help Must be Part of the P2P
Piracy Solution, at <writ.corporate.findlaw.com/commentary/
20021001_berman.html> (visited February 20, 2006).
32. Suppappola, supra note 3, at 165.
33. Id.
34. Jon Healey & P.J. Huffstutter, 4 Pay Steep Price for Free Music, L.A. TIMES,
May 2, 2003, at Al.
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P2P file sharing.35 In the most publicized file sharing case, the record
industry sued Napster for vicarious and contributory copyright
infringement for facilitating unauthorized copying, downloading,
transmission, and distribution of copyrighted works by others.36 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Napster's "fair use"
argument, holding that a showing of significant noncommercial use
would not be sufficient to overcome liability for contributory
infringement. The court stated, "[I]f a defendant could show that its
product was capable of substantial and significant noncommercial
uses, the copyright owner [then] would be required to show that the
defendant had reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files."37
Although the court found that Napster was capable of commercially
significant non-infringing uses,38 it concluded that "sufficient
knowledge existed to impose contributory liability when linked to
demonstrated infringing use of the Napster system."39 Specifically,
the record supported the court's finding that "Napster has actual
knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its
system, that it could block access to the system by suppliers of the
infringing material, and that it failed to remove the material.,
40
Despite the ruling against Napster - which lead the company to file
for bankruptcy protection - a myriad of similar services, such as
Gnutella, Bearshare, and Limewire, immediately sprang up and took
Napster's place.41
The RIAA continued its aggressive litigation tactics against P2P
software providers, apparently unfazed by the rapid appearance of
Napster's successors and the failure of the Napster decision to deter
further P2P software developers. 4 The RIAA faced an even more
43problematic issue with the onslaught of new P2P software engines.
Napster was held liable because its service ran on a centralized server,
meaning the company could control the content being transferred."4
However, many of the new engines, such as Grokster and Morpheus,
35. Yu, supra note 11, at 388.
36. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
37. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001).
38. Id. at 1021.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1022.
41. Yu, supra note 11, at 391.
42. Yu, supra note 5, at 681.
43. Yu, supra note 11, at 391.
44. Napster, supra note 37.
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developed by Streamcast Networks, 5 did not have a centralized
server. 6 In the Grokster case, Justice Souter wrote for a surprising
unanimous Court that "one who distributes a device with the object
of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is
liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties., 47 In
other words, the Court essentially created a new indirect copyright
infringement cause of action derived from patent law - a theory of
inducement - in which one could be held liable based on the existence
of improper intent.'
The entertainment industry celebrated the Grokster ruling. 9
Peter Felcher, one of the lawyers acting for rightsholders in the
Grokster case, proclaimed the decision as "a victory for copyright
owners, and the fact that it was nine to nothing spoke in a good way
for copyright holders."' While Grokster was arguably a victory for
copyright owners, the decision has not helped solve the online
infringement problem for the RIAA 1 In the wake of the Grokster
decision, the RIAA has sent cease-and-desist letters to several P2P
operators, which as a result, has lead them to either shut down (which
former P2P platforms such as eDonkey, Bearshare, Kazaa, and
WinMX have done) or transform themselves into legal music
52services. Some of the P2P operators, like Kazaa who decision to
transform itself into a legal music service will pay more than $100
million in a settlement to various record labels. 3
Despite the success of RIAA's recent litigation, the number of
45. Q&A: File sharing Ruling, BBC NEWS (June 6, 2005), at
<newsvote.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/l/hi/technology/4628291.stm> (visited March 3, 2006).
46. Yu, supra note 11, at 391.
47. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2780
(2005).
48. Id.
49. Monika Ermert, After Grokster, Industry Seeks Legal P2P as Mobile Music
Takes Over, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Jan. 29, 2006), at <www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=209&res=1024 ff&pr> (visited Sept. 30, 2006).
50. Id
51. David Murphy, What Happened to Grokster9, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE
(December 2005), at <docket.medill.northwestern.edu/archives/003274.php> (visited
February 13, 2006).
52. P2P Companies to Exit Business, DRM WATCH STAFF (September 22, 2005),
at <www.drmwatch.com/ocr/article.php/3550721> (visited September 14, 2006).
53. Caroline McCarthy, With Settlement, Kazaa Casts Off Its Pirate Garb, CNET
NEWS.COM (July 27, 2006), at <news.com.com/Kazaa+settles+suits+with+
more+than+100+million/2100-1027_3-6099064.html> (visited September 5, 2006).
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P2P file-sharers has not dropped. Technology research firm
BigChampagne reported that approximately 6.5 million users shared
files on P2P systems as of October 2005. . In fact, BigChampagne
reports that the most recent peak in sharing directly followed the
Grokster decision in July." One possible explanation for this is that
court rulings do not deter users from file sharing, but instead merely
force them to migrate from one program to another. 6 Moreover,
Fred von Lohmann, a senior staff attorney for the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, suggests that the Grokster decision will have a limited
impact because a company could escape liability by simply not
promoting its service as an infringement tool or as a method for
obtaining illegal gains."
Despite the fact that its legal victories against P2P software
providers have not deterred file sharing, the RIAA continues to
launch misguided attacks on the supply side of the P2P problem. For
example, the RIAA has begun using copyright protection
technologies, known as Digital Rights Management ("DRM").
58
These technologies, which include encryption, digital watermarking,
and the use of trusted systems, are meant to allow copyright holders
to lock up their creative works. 59 However, such measures entice
hackers eager to crack the latest encryption technology available.
60
This could cause a copy-protection arms race between the
61 tientertainment industry and hacker community. If this happened,
the industry would essentially be spending money on copy-protection
technology that yielded a proportionately small return, if any at all.62
Further, using DRM to combat piracy could cause a backlash.63
There is a very fine line between protecting digital technology and
creating an unattractive product for consumers. 64 Sony, for example,
suffered negative criticism after announcing its plans to release copy-
protected CDs that can only be copied from a computer to a Sony








62. Id. at 393
63. Suppappola, supra note 3, at 171.
64. Id.
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portable player.65
Ultimately, the RIAA's greatest mistake has been relying on
laws that 1) create confusion about what the law is, and 2) utterly
ignore social and culture norms. Copyright laws are so complicated
and dense that even copyright scholars and lawyers have difficulty
discerning the true meaning and extent of the law. 6
Past laws have created a culture in which many believe
downloading music files for personal consumption is not or should
not be a crime.67 This logic has stemmed from a variety of sources,
starting with the Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. decision.68 The Court held that an individual could
legally copy television shows (copyrighted works) when done for the
purpose of "time-shifting," (i.e., recording a program that was
broadcast on television, watching it once at a later time, and then
erasing the recording) which is considered "non-commercial fair
use."69 The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 ("AHRA") codified
and enforced the "fair use" doctrine.0 The AHRA prohibits bringing
a lawsuit alleging copyright infringement based on the
noncommercial copying of music by a consumer."'" Sony and the
AHRA have led consumers to believe that occasionally downloading
a few songs is not a serious crime unless it is for profit. This belief
helps explain why many P2P file sharers have a difficult time
believing that downloading music online does not fall within the "fair
use" exception because it is "economic in nature.""
Opponents of P2P file sharing might contend that consumers'
prior understanding of the law is irrelevant because all that matters is
what is illegal now. Much like the record industry's deficient attempts
65. Id
66. Peter K. Yu, Still Dissatisfied After All These Years.- Intellectual Property,
Post- WTO China, and the A voidable Cycle of Futility, Legal Studies Research Paper
Series Research Paper No. 03-11, GEOR. J. OF INT'L & COMP. L., Vol. 34, 2005,
available at <ssrn.com/abstract=578584> (visited March 9, 2006).
67. Id at 11.
68. Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984).
69. Id at 456.
70. David J. Colletti, Jr., Technology Under Siege: Peer-to-Peer Technology is
the Victim of the Entertainment Industry's Misguided Attack, 71 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 255, 260 (2003).
71. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. 17 § 1008 (2000)).
72. Yu, supra note 11, at 378
73. Napster, supra note 37.
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to eradicate file sharing, this position ignores the social and cultural
realities of today's world.74 Consumers may have been more willing
to accept that downloading music was a serious crime had it not been
for the building enmity music fans felt towards the record labels.75
Many consumers feel CDs are entirely overpriced (especially with
only one or two good songs on the album) and that record companies
71have engaged in collusive pricing to maintain such high prices.
Charging roughly $16 per CD is a bit excessive considering that a CD
costs less than a dollar to manufacture.77 Many people who have
never used P2P software to download music share this sentiment,
believing a more appropriate price would be 50 cents per song or $3
for an album.8 In light of the music industry's price gouging, many
P2P file-sharers see music piracy as a form of protest against record
79companies. When one student was asked why she downloads free
music without feeling bad about it, the student described record
companies as "evil conglomerates who shove mediocre music down
[consumers'] throats at inflated prices and then gouge the artist's
profits."8°
Illegal file sharing will continue at alarming rates as long as
consumers continue to see the record industry as the greedy
middleman, and the record industry continues viewing file sharing as
an epidemic that needs to be squashed by stricter rules and penalties.
As Fred von Lohmann candidly surmises, "[M]ost file-sharers, most
music fans frankly know that it's against the law, and they don't care.
I don't think that legal decisions are going to make any difference at
this stage.,
81
74. Condry, supra note 18 (manuscript at 2, on file with author).




79. Yu, supra note 11, at 383.
80. Angelique Little, Record Industry Should Embrace Online Services, L. A.
TIMES, May 25, 2003, at Business 13.
81. Murphy, supra note 51, at 2.
2006]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
II. Same Song, Different Singers: The U.S. Battle to
Achieve Greater Intellectual Property Protection in
China
A. Another Misguided Approach
The recent accession of China into the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") has only further cemented a long-standing
truth: China's importance in the global economic community.'
Despite its accession into the WTO, China's lack of intellectual
property protection poses a great concern. China has always been
considered a country with one of the highest piracy rates. 3 With the
emergence of technology that can produce unlimited perfect copies of
copyrighted material in digital format, the ability of piracy hotbeds
such as China to illegally make and sell copies of popular CDs,
DVDs, and software applications has become an even greater
84concern.
However, like the music industry, the United States has adopted
a narrow, self-interested approach in dealing with the Chinese
intellectual property problem. This approach is based on the United
States' 1) concern only for the ultimate impact Chinese IP laws will
have on U.S. business opportunities and 2) ethnocentric view of what
constitutes sufficient intellectual property protections.85
The United States' concern for the direct fiscal impact Chinese
infringement has on the U.S is understandable considering the
statistics: in 2004, infringement levels remained at 90 percent or above
for virtually every form of intellectual property, and estimated U.S.
losses alone ranged between $2.5 billion and $3.8 billion.86 However,
in multiple instances the United States was concerned more with the
82. Min S,.Xu & Jon F. Tuttle, China Has Joined the WTO. Are You Prepared?
(2003), available at <library.findlaw.com/2003/Aug/14/132989.html> (visited March 3,
2006).
83. Eric J. Sinrod, Reducing Software Piracy Will Produce More Jobs and a
Stronger Economy (January 5, 2006), available at
<writ.corporate.findlaw.com/commentary/20060105_sinrod.html> (visited October
12, 2006).
84. Ku, supra note 2, at 264.
85. Peter K. Yu, How the International Intellectual Property System, Meant to
Create Global Harmony, Has Created Conflict Instead, FINDLAW'S WRIT (Nov. 14,
2002), at <writ.corporate.findlaw.com/commentary/20021114-yu.html> (visited Feb.
9, 2006).
86. Yu, supra note 66, at 1.
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bottom line than much larger issues." The United States turns a blind
eye towards egregious human rights and civil liberties violations so
long as it can secure stronger intellectual property rights. 8  For
example, Chinese authorities enlisted the help of law enforcers who
were notorious for human rights violations in order to comply with
Western demands for stricter piracy enforcement. s9 In addition,
Chinese authorities have enforced the death penalty on infringers in
severe cases as a way to demonstrate China's seriousness about
eradicating piracy.' The United States' complicity in this process
reinforces the common perception that Western governments are
more concerned with intellectual property rights than civil rights in
China.9 '
Moreover, the United States has been stubbornly ethnocentric
by insisting on an intellectual property regime largely modeled after
those of the West.' The United States has essentially demanded that
China institute the U.S. copyright system, which the United States
believes is superior.93  However, this will inevitably lead to an
inefficient and potentially harmful system. 94 For example, the United
States' 1976 Copyright Act was the product of compromises among
American interest groups that participated in the drafting process.95
Presumably, China does not face similar interest group pressure, nor
does China have the same needs and concerns that the United States
had. A verbatim transplant of the Copyright Act would therefore
likely harm China's interests and hamper IP law reform.96
87. Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in
China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U.L. REV. 131,133 (2000).
88. Id. at 174.
89. William P. Alford, Making the World Safe for What? Intellectual Property
Rights, Human Rights and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-European Cold War
World, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 135,143 (1997).
90. Id.
91. Robert Burrell, A Case Study in Cultural Imperialism: The Imposition of
Copyright on China by the West, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ETHICS 195 (Lionel
Bently & Spyros M. Maniatis eds., 1998).
92. Yu, supra note 85.
93. Yu, supra note 66, at 5.
94. Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use
Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate (2001),
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B. What Else Could Result From a Misguided Approach? More
Misguided Solutions
In an attempt to bring intellectual property reforms to China, the
United States has instituted coercive measures that include threats of
trade sanctions, trade wars, non-renewal of most-favored-nation
status, and opposition to China's entry into the WTO.9 These laws
have ushered in a new, yet inadequate intellectual property system.8
The United States' coercive tactics have created a cycle of futility: the
United States threatens China with sanctions; China responds with
retaliatory threats; after months of negotiation, the two finally
hammer out an agreement whereby China makes short-term
concessions; but because the improvements are short lived, the entire
process begins again.99
Much like in the music industry, the United States' tactics in
China may backfire, leading to China's retaliation, hostility, and
reluctance to adopt any further Western intellectual property
reforms.'0 For example, when the United States threatened to
sanction China for its lack of intellectual property protection, Chinese
Premier Li Peng responded by making a $1.5 billion order for French
Airbus planes over of American Boeing planes.'0 ' The United States'
threats undermined, rather than accomplished, its economic goal in
this instance." Such a confrontational policy could also lead risk-
aversive companies to limit their business in China. 3  If these
coercive threats continue to escalate, the United States might find
itself faced with complete boycotts of American products, ' a
destabilized international trading system,' 5 a global trade war in
which resources are allocated inefficiently, and criticism from other
countries.' °6 Such consequences would severely and negatively impact
the United States and international trade in general."°
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The United States has also targeted the supply channels of piracy
in China without addressing why demand for piracy exists."" But the
United States has not limited its focus to the cartels responsible for
producing mass quantities of pirated goods; it has also targeted the
Chinese authorities for their inability to crack down on piracy.' ° One
analyst opined:
It is laughable to hear excuses from Beijing that they can't control
the 50 pirate CD factories. If they were turning out thousands of
copies of the BBC documentary on the Tianemen Square protest -
rather than bootleg copies of "The Lion King" - the factory
managers would be sharing a cell with other dissidents in a
heartbeat.""
The above statement speaks volumes about the United States'
generally misguided approach to Chinese piracy. The United States
should consider that the high demand for pirated goods in China
derives from China's strict control over the dissemination of
information and media products.' China's heavy regulation of the
media business and publishing industry makes many high-demand
products unavailable to consumers, who must look to the black
market and pirated goods."2 Rather than focusing on piracy cartels
and the ineffectiveness of Chinese authorities, the United States
should pressure the Chinese government to lessen its restriction on
the type of goods allowed in the country. This would decrease piracy
more effectively than shutting down a piracy factory that will be
replaced by ten more factories upon its closure. '3
China's failure to protect intellectual property is not a
consequence of its lack of laws. Thanks to the United States'
coercion, China has very comprehensive IP laws in place that even
recognize some rights that the U.S. laws do not."' But these laws
merely exist in the books because the United States imposed them
without regard to the cultural, social, political, and economic realities
of China."5 To be effective, laws must be accompanied by a legal
108. Yu, supra note 66, at 9.
109. Id.
110. Id
111. Yu, supra note 11, at 417.
112. Id
113. Id at 418.
114. Yu, supra note 94, at 42.
115. Id at 43.
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culture that fosters voluntary compliance."6
The Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States
and the PRC - one of the earliest treaties signed after China's
reopening - illustrates the United States' disregard for local values."7
By virtue of this agreement, China assumed an international legal
obligation for intellectual property before it had even established a
domestic intellectual property protection system. 18 The idea that a
country could respect, let alone enforce, an international treaty for a
type of law which the country itself had not yet adopted makes little
sense.
The United States has also refused to take into account Chinese
cultural and moral norms that shape Chinese attitudes toward
intellectual property protection. Confucian principles have
predominated in China for centuries."9 Confucianism views creativity
as a collective benefit to the community and despises commerce,
especially those who created works for sheer profit." The concept of
a copyright, which allows a significant few to monopolize important
materials, directly contradicts traditional Chinese moral standards. 2'
The notion of "property" is a cultural norm, since there is nothing
inherent in an object that connotes ownership; it would be naive to
believe that such a norm could change simply because a rule has been
instituted. '22 Nonetheless, the United States' coercive measures
attempt to do just that.
The United States has also repeatedly ignored political and legal
realities, conveniently forgetting the lasting impact the Cultural
Revolution had on the citizens of China.'" The Cultural Revolution
coordinated massive socialist campaigns that emphasized the welfare
of the State and disapproved of concepts such as authorship and
remuneration from creative efforts. One steel worker during the
Cultural Revolution asked,
Is it necessary for a steel worker to put his name on a steel ingot
116. Id.
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118. Id. at 356.
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that he produces in the course of his duty? If not, why should a
member of the intelligentsia enjoy the privilege of putting his name. 125
on what he produces?
Despite reforms, cultivating respect for intellectual property
rights has been a slow process, especially after socialist propaganda
inundated Chinese people for so long.26
The United States has further disregarded China's current legal
and political realities by assuming China has a legal system that can
enforce the laws that the United States thrusts upon it.'27 Among the
current problems facing China are the absence of the rule of law, lack
of transparency within the court system, confusion caused by
conflicting laws and regulations, confusion and rivalry within the
enforcement apparatus, and corruption. 812 The possibility of effective
enforcement at the grassroots level is unlikely until these issues can
be resolved. 9
III. Possible Solutions
The current solutions to P2P online infringement and piracy in
China have clearly been ineffective. However, there are several
possible solutions that could be effective when applied to both
situations.
A. Educating Nonstakeholders about the Copyright System' 0
A clear divide exists between those who wish to achieve strong
intellectual property protections and those who are either indifferent
or would rather not see such strict standards enforced. Members of
the former category are the "stakeholders" and include copyright
holders and countries such as the United States Members of the
latter category are the "nonstakeholders" and include P2P file-
sharers, Chinese authorities, and Chinese citizens who purchase
counterfeit goods. In order to bridge the divide between these
groups, nonstakeholders must be educated about the benefits of
125. William P. Alfred, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION, 13 (1995).
126. Yu, supra note 94, at 14.
127. Id. at 43.
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130. Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907, 908
(2004).
2006]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
maintaining a copyright system. For P2P file-sharers, education
should include clarifying the law in a language that makes sense.
Although it may be difficult to convince the current generation that
copyright infringement ultimately harms the millionaire artists they
love, education might slightly decrease the number of file-swappers.
Since a significant and immediate impact on file sharers is unlikely,
the record industry should focus on future generations by gradually
eradicating the acceptability of downloading music for free."'
Education would likely have a much greater impact in China.
Educating China about the benefits of copyright protection has
already proved successful. 3 2 For example, the Business Software
Alliance and the Chinese Software Alliance successfully promoted
the use of original software in China, causing many Chinese to stop
seeing copyright protection as alien.
13
Equally important as educating Chinese citizens about IP is
educating Chinese authorities about how to prioritize a sound IP
protection scheme. A recent study showed that a 10 percentage point
decrease in China's piracy could generate 2.6 million IT jobs in China
by 2009. T" This figure should be very enticing to a country such as
China, which is desperate to expand its economic power.
B. Incentive to Adhere to Copyright Laws
The only way to reduce copyright infringement to acceptable
levels is to provide an incentive for people to adhere to the laws
rather than infringe on copyrights. Federal judges can rule that file
trading infringes on copyrights and enjoin online services that allow
file trading, but judges cannot make the 30 million people exchanging
music files over the Internet obey the copyright laws.136 This same
logic applies to China as well: no matter how many laws are passed,
there must be an incentive for Chinese citizens to avoid purchasing
pirated goods.
But why would rational consumers pay a premium price for
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legitimate goods when almost identical copies are available for free
(via download) or at a lower cost (pirated copies)? 37  A rational
consumer will usually not pay a premium for identical objects.'38 Most
consumers try to obtain as many things they can as cheaply as
possible. 9 However, just because something is "free," that does not
mean people will not pay for the item. 40 Consumers have been
willing to pay and use commercial means when there is some value in
doing so (i.e., bottled water compared to tap water). 14' The solution
to piracy in the United States and China must therefore turn on how
consumers can be convinced to pay money for content that is
obtainable for free or at a reduced cost.
One method is to avoid making the products identical by offering
a premium that is unobtainable in the illegal goods. Premiums may
be tangible or intangible. Tangible premiums are warranties,
replacement part guarantees, free upgrades, giveaways, and bonus
materials on CDs (much like the DVD movie model of special
features). 42 Intangible benefits are ease of mind, taking comfort in
supporting the artist, and obtaining legitimate products (the lack of
accountability in the black market creates a risk that the consumer
will not get the desired product).' 3
While premiums are attractive to consumers, premiums will have
little impact if the industry continues to price things above market
value. Industries like the RIAA must lower the prices of CDs, which
are universally considered to be overpriced. One possible way to
lower prices is to use Magnatune's example of "tipping."'"
Magnatune is a model in which consumers can listen to an entire
album for free but are asked to pay the "suggested price" of $5 if they
wish to download the album onto a CD."45  Despite posting a
suggested price of $5, Magnatune reported that is receives an average
of $8.63 an album, which shows that not all consumers will pay the
lowest price possible for an item."'4
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Further, the RIAA must lower its prices for legal MP3
downloads as well. Although 99 cents per song may seem reasonably
low, it is not. An iPod, for example, costs a consumer around $300,
but will hold up to 15,000 songs.' 7 At 99 cents a download, it would
be unreasonable to expect a consumer to spend $15,000 (500 times
the amount they spent on the hardware, or the equivalent of a brand
new car) to fill it. Further market research must be done to find an
optimum price that entices enough customers to download the songs
legally while still allowing labels and artists to make a profit. If music
were cheap enough, consumers might not think copying is
worthwhile. 48
While it is unlikely record industries would be willing to take this
risk, an alternative might be to price products at or below cost. One
way to drive away pirates is to make it unprofitable for them to
continue. This would also allow most file-sharers to become
accustomed to purchasing music legally online and change the current
culture of free downloading. Microsoft garnered and maintained its
large market share through similar tactics. The RIAA might be
desperate enough to engage in such dubious actions.
Alternative pricing can also be applied to the piracy problem in
China, and in a few limited instances, it already has already been
applied.49  For instance, the movie industry has begun releasing low
priced dubbed films in China.150  This provides a more reliable
product to film purchasers without the threat of entering the United
States as parallel imports, since the films are dubbed in the local
language. 5' Further, as Chinese citizens increase their disposable
income, they may become increasingly unsatisfied with the low
quality entertainment found in the black market and begin to demand
authentic goods.'52  These expectations and how they will
correspondingly affect potential prices must still be tempered.'53 Even
though disposable income in China is expected to grow 20 percent
annually, a Chinese citizen cannot be expected to pay $20 (Western
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prices) for a textbook when her household income is $40 a month.1 54
Conclusion
There is no doubt that copyright infringement is a serious
problem. The number of infringers, specifically consumers of pirated
goods and P2P file-sharers, has burgeoned to staggering numbers.
Both the United States and the RIAA have reacted to-the problem in
a terribly shortsighted and narrow-minded manner. The United
States and the RIAA then compounded the problem by instituting
solutions that caused more harm than good. Even worse, each party
refused to compromise its position in spite of the recurring failures.
The dangers of refusing to find a compromise in an area as
complicated as copyright and intellectual property law is best
illustrated by an imaginary conversation between two people using
maritime radios:
FIRST SPEAKER: Please divert your course 15 degrees to the
north to avoid a collision, over.
SECOND SPEAKER: Recommend you divert YOUR course 15
degrees, over.
FIRST SPEAKER: This is the captain of a US Navy ship. I say
again, divert your course, over.
SECOND SPEAKER: No, I say again, divert YOUR course, over.
FIRST SPEAKER: This is an aircraft carrier of the US Navy. We
are a large warship. Divert your course now! Over.
SECOND SPEAKER: This is a lighthouse, your call. 5
Regardless of the situation, it is always more prudent to
understand the totality of the circumstances before deciding on a
course to follow. By more fully comprehending the complexities of
copyright and intellectual property law, the United States can chart a
better course in its approach to piracy.
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